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Abstract
We introduce endogenous strategic interactions under competition in quantities and in
prices together with endogenous entry in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
with ﬂexible prices. The endogenous mark ups depend on the form of competition and on
the degree of substitutability between goods, and they vary countercylically while proﬁts
are procyclical. Positive temporary shocks to productivity and government spending attract
entry. Entry strengthens competition between ﬁrms, which temporary reduces mark ups and
prices: this creates an intertemporal substitution eﬀect which provides an extra boost to
consumption. The model outperforms the standard RBC framework in matching impulse
response functions and second moments for US data.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The neoclassical theory of the business cycle, which is well represented by the work of Kyd-
land and Prescott (1982), is based on perfect competition and constant returns to scale. In
this environment goods are priced at the marginal cost, there is no room for proﬁts and the
structure of the markets is indeterminate (i.e.: the number of ﬁrms and their individual pro-
duction are irrelevant). However, a wide theoretical and empirical literature has emphasized
the importance of market power to explain the behavior of the economy along the business
cycle.2 For this reason the new-keynesian theory, starting with Blanchard and Kiyotaki
(1987), has introduced product diﬀerentiation and imperfect competition in general equi-
librium models. Most of this literature departed from the neoclassical framework assuming
monopolistic competition àl aDixit-Stiglitz (1977) between an exogenous number of ﬁrms
producing diﬀerentiated goods. This approach rapidly became the standard framework for
the analysis of macroeconomic policy, with a focus on monetary policy in the presence of
simple forms of price stickiness. Nevertheless, also the monopolistic competition approach
leads to an exogenous market structure. As such it neglects the role of strategic interactions
between ﬁrms of the same sectors, it neglects the endogeneity of the number of ﬁrms, and it
neglects the impact of entry on the same strategic interactions. The result is that the struc-
ture of the sectors of the economy remains a sort of “black box” whose main components,
mark ups and number of competitors, are exogenous.
In this paper we try to open the “black box” of the market structure and link the en-
dogenous behavior of ﬁrms at the sectoral level with the general equilibrium properties of
the economy, and in particular with its business cycle properties. We consider distinct sec-
tors, each one characterized by many ﬁrms supplying homogenous goods (as in the basic
neoclassical framework) or diﬀerentiated goods (as in the new-keynesian literature), taking
strategic interactions into account and competing either in prices (Bertrand competition) or
in quantities (Cournot competition).3 Building on recent work by Bilbiie et al. (2007a,b), we
introduce ﬁxed costs of entry to endogenize the number of ﬁr m si ne a c hs e c t o r ,h o w e v e ri n
our context the number of ﬁrms aﬀects the equilibrium prices and mark ups in each sector.
Therefore mark ups are endogenous and depend on the form of competition, on the degree of
substitutability between goods and on the number of ﬁrms. For instance, in the presence of
homogenous goods Cournot competition allows to preserve substantial mark ups as long as
the endogenous market structure is concentrated enough. The rest of the economy operates
as in a standard dynamic ﬂexible price model.
In this context, a temporary supply shock induces a novel propagation mechanism: it ini-
tially increases proﬁts, which attracts entry of ﬁr m s ,w h i c hi nt u r ns t r e n g t h e n sc o m p e t i t i o n
and reduces the mark ups. For instance, in the above mentioned case of highly concentrated
sectors with Cournot competition, the reduction in the mark ups is quite strong. The asso-
ciated temporary reduction of the prices induces a stronger intertemporal substitution eﬀect
in favor of current consumption, which magniﬁes the eﬀect of the shock compared to a per-
fectly competitive model. Finally, the temporary increase in demand has a positive feedback
eﬀect on proﬁts which keeps the propagation mechanism alive. Compared to a standard
RBC model, this framework can perform better in terms of output and consumption volatil-
2See Hall (1986, 1990), Bils (1987), Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and more recently Galì (2007a).
3We also consider a conjectural variation model that generalizes competition in quantities to forms of
imperfect collusion and a Stackelberg model. An important early work on endogenous mark ups in a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model is Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), which relies on a perfectly collusive
framework. However, even if it is able to generate countercylical mark ups, the Rotemberg-Woodford model
does not endogenizes the entry process.












Figure 1: Price Mark Up and Real GDP.
ity, and it allows to generate procyclical movements of aggregate proﬁts and countercylical
movements of the mark ups.
Notice ﬁnally that the endogeneity of the market structures allows to generate realistic
impulse response functions for demand shocks as well. A temporary increase in government
spending creates a boom as in the RBC framework, but, contrary to the latter, it increases
proﬁts on impact, attracts entry, reduces the mark ups, increases the real wages, and allows
to obtain a delayed consumption boom.
As argued by Bilbiie et al. (2007b), the emphasis on markup countercyclicality and proﬁt
procyclicality is not misplaced.4 We constructed a labor-share based measure of the markup
for the U.S. along the lines suggested by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). Figure 1 plots
the HP ﬁltered series of the price markup together with HP ﬁltered real GDP at a quarterly
frequency from 1975:1 to 2007:2. The contemporaneous correlation between the two variables
is -0.31. Figure 2 plots, instead, HP ﬁltered GDP together with the HP ﬁltered series of real
corporate proﬁts for the same period speciﬁed above. The contemporaneous correlation is
positive and equal to 0.60. The picture documents that proﬁts are extremely volatile, with
respect to GDP, at the business cycle frequencies.5
This paper borrows inspiration from an emerging literature on endogenous market struc-
tures in diﬀerent ﬁelds. A closer attention to endogeneous entry and endogenous mark ups
has characterized the recent industrial organization literature on the microeconomic behav-
ior of ﬁrms and also the macroeconomic literature on general equilibrium models for closed
and open economies.6 Endogenous entry and strategic interactions in the competition for
4For a recent empirical work providing extensive evidence on the crucial role of entry along the business
cycle see Broda and Weinstein (2007).
5All variables have been logged. When a detrending process is involved we use the HP ﬁlter with a
smoothing parameter equal to 1600 (given quarterly frequency). See the Data Appendix for a description of
the data series.
6On the microeconomic applications see Etro (2006, 2008b) and on the macroeconomic applications see










Figure 2: Real Proﬁts and Real GDP.
the market have been recently introduced in dynamic general equilibrium growth models for
closed and open economies (Etro, 2004, 2008a). Most importantly, after early attempts to en-
dogenize entry with ﬁxed costs of production in each period (notably Chattejee and Cooper,
1993, and Devereux et al., 1996),7 the recent work of Bilbiie et al. (2007a,b) has provided
an important contribution on endogenous entry in a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium
model. This line of research does not take in consideration the strategic interactions between
ﬁrms and the impact of entry on them, but it focuses on the traditional case of constant
mark ups due to monopolistic competition.8 More recently, Jaimovich (2007) has augmented
the model of Deveraux et al. (1996) with mark ups depending on the number of ﬁrms -
according to the extension of the Dixit-Stiglitz model due to Yand and Heijdra (1993). That
model endogenizes entry through ﬁxed costs of production in each period, so that proﬁts are
again zero at all times, and not procyclical as in our framework, and it focuses on diﬀerent
issues, nevertheless it complements our work suggesting a crucial role for market structures
in explaining the business cycle.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and its dynamic prop-
erties under competition in quantities and in prices. Section 3 calibrates and simulates the
model. Section 4 concludes. Technical details are left in the Appendix.
Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Etro (2007).
7Cooper (1999) surveys this early literature. Chatterjee et al. (1993) endogenize entry as well, but their
f o c u si so ns u n s p o t se q u i l i b r i ai na nO L Gm o d e l .
8Bilbiie et al. (2007a,b) and Bergin and Corsetti (2005) have introduced the translog preferences (due
to Feenstra, 2003) to derive an elasticity of substitution between products that depends on the number of
ﬁrms. As long as entry increases the substitutability between the existing goods, this generates mark ups
depending on the number of goods, but such an ad hoc explanation is unrelated to endogenous motivations
on the supply side.
42 The Model
















υ,ϕ ≥ 0 (1)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, Lt is labor supply and Ckt is a consumption index for
the goods produced in sector k =1 ,2,..,M. The representative agent supplies labor for a
nominal wage Wt and allocates his or her savings between bonds or stocks. The intratemporal
optimality conditions for the optimal choices of Ckt and Lt require:











where Et is total expenditure allocated to the goods produced in each sector in period t and
Pkt is the price index for consumption in sector k: due to the unitary elasticity of substitution,
total expenditure is equally shared between the sectors.
Each sector k is characterized by diﬀerent ﬁrms i =1 ,2,...,Nkt producing the same good











where Ckt(i) is the production of ﬁrm i of this sector, and θ>1 is the elasticity of substitution
between the goods produced in each sector. The distinction between diﬀerent sectors and
diﬀerent goods within a sector allows to realistically separate limited substitutability at
the aggregated level, and high substitutability at the disaggregated level. Contrary to many
macroeconomic models with imperfect competition, our focus will be on the market structure
of disaggregated sectors: intrasectoral substitubility (between goods produced by ﬁrms of a
same sector) is high or perfect (when θ →∞ ), while intersectoral substitutability is low.
Each ﬁrm i in sector k produces a good with a linear production function. To abstract
from capital accumulation issues, we assume that labor is the only input. Output of ﬁrm i
in sector k is then:
ykt(i)=AtLkt(i) (5)
where At is total factor productivity at time t,a n dLkt(i) is total labor employed by ﬁrm i
in sector k. This implies that the production of one good requires 1/At units of labor, and
the marginal cost of production is Wt/At.
Since each sector can be characterized in the same way, in what follows we will drop the
index k and refer to a representative sector (alternatively think of M =1 ). Further details
are provided in the Appendix.
2.1 Endogenous Market Structures
In each period, the same expenditure for each sector Et is allocated across the available
goods according to the standard direct demand function derived from the maximization of
















i =1 ,2,...,Nt (6)












such that total expenditure satisﬁes Et =
PNt
j=1 pt(j)Ct(j)=CtPt. Inverting the direct









i =1 ,2,...,Nt (8)
where xt(i) is the consumption of good i.
We assume that ﬁrms cannot credibly commit to a sequence of strategies, therefore their
behavior is equivalent to maximize current proﬁts in each period taking as given the strategies
of the other ﬁrms. Each good is produced at the constant marginal cost common to all ﬁrms.
A main interest of this paper is in the comparison of equilibria where in each period ﬁrms
compete in quantities and in prices, taking as given their marginal cost of production and the
aggregate expenditure of the representative consumer.9 Under diﬀerent forms of competition





where µ(θ,Nt) > 1 is the mark up depending on the degree of substitutability between
goods θ and on the number of ﬁrms Nt. In the next sections we characterize this mark up
under competition in quantities and in prices, and we sketch how to consider other forms of
competition including conjectural variations and Stackelberg models.
2.1.1 Competition in quantities
First, let us consider competition in quantities, which has been systematically ignored in
general equilibrium macroeconomic models. Using the inverse demand function (8), we can






















9Of course, both of them are endogenous in general equilibrium, but it is reasonable to assume that ﬁrms
do not perceive marginal cost and aggregate expenditure in the sector as aﬀected by their choices.
6Assume now that each ﬁrm chooses its production xt(i) taking as given the production of


























for all ﬁrms i =1 ,2,...,Nt can be simpliﬁed imposing symmetry of the Cournot equilibrium.
This generates the individual output:
xt =




Substituting into the inverse price, one obtains the equilibrium price pt = WtθNt/At(θ −
1)(Nt − 1), which is associated with the equilibrium mark up:
µQ(θ,Nt)=
θNt
(θ − 1)(Nt − 1)
(12)
where the index Q stands for competition in quantities. Notice that the mark up is decreasing
in the degree of substitutability between products θ, with an elasticity  
Q
θ =1 /(θ − 1).
The markup remains positive for any degree of substitutability, since even in the case of
homogenous goods, we have limθ→∞ µQ(θ,Nt)=Nt/(Nt − 1). This allow us to consider
the eﬀect of strategic interactions in an otherwise standard setup with perfect substitute
goods within sectors (which has been traditionally studied only under perfect competition in
the neoclassical tradition). Finally, in the general formulation the markup is decreasing and
convex in the number of ﬁrms and it tends to θ/(θ − 1) > 1 for Nt →∞ . Its elasticity is
 
Q
N =1 /(N−1), which is decreasing in the number of ﬁrms (the mark up decreases with entry
at an increasing rate) and independent from the degree of substitutability between goods.
Given the nominal proﬁts Π
Q









which are clearly decreasing in the number of ﬁrms and in the substitutability level.
2.1.2 Competition in prices
Let us now consider competition in prices. In each period, the gross proﬁts of ﬁrm i can be
expressed as:
Πt [pt(i)] =








Firms compete by choosing their prices. Contrary to the traditional Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)
approach which neglects strategic interactions between ﬁrms, we will take these into consid-
eration and derive the exact Bertrand equilibrium. Each ﬁrm i chooses the price pt(i) to
maximize proﬁts taking as given the price of the other ﬁrms.10 The ﬁrst order condition for
10Since total expenditure Et is equalized between sectors by the consumers, we assume that it is also
perceived as given by the ﬁrms. Under the alternative hypothesis that consumption Ct is perceived as given,




















Notice that the term on the right hand side is the eﬀect of the price strategy of a ﬁrm on
the price index: higher prices reduce overall demand, therefore ﬁrms tend to set higher mark
ups compared to monopolistic competition. Imposing symmetry between the Nt ﬁrms, the


























(θ − 1)(Nt − 1)
(15)
The mark up under competition in prices is always smaller than the one obtained before under
competition in quantities, as well known for models of product diﬀerentiation (see for instance
Vives, 1999). As in the previous case, the mark up is decreasing in the degree of substitutabil-
ity between products θ, with an elasticity  P
θ = θNt/(1 − θ + θNt)(θ − 1) which is always
higher than  
Q
θ : higher substitutability reduces mark ups faster under competition in prices.
Moreover, contrary to the case of competition in quantities, the mark up under competition in
prices vanishes in case of perfect substitutability: limθ→∞ µP(θ,Nt)=1 . Finally, the mark up
is again decreasing in the number of ﬁrms, with an elasticity  P
N = N/[1 + θ(N − 1)](N − 1).
Since  
Q
N >  P
N for any number of ﬁrms or degree of substitutability, we can conclude that
entry decreases mark ups faster under competition in quantities compared to competition in
prices. Moreover, the elasticity of the mark up to entry under competition in prices is de-
creasing in the level of substitutability between goods, and it tends to zero when the goods are
approximately homogenous. These results will play a crucial role in our subsequent analysis
of the propagation mechanism of the business cycle under diﬀerent forms of competition.







which is again a decreasing function of the number of ﬁrms and of the substitutability between
goods.
2.1.3 Other forms of competition
Our framework can be used to study other forms of competition. To give the ﬂavor of these
possibilities we brieﬂy report two simple extensions for the case of homogenous goods. Other
we would obtain the higher mark up:
˜ µP(θ,Nt)=
θ(Nt − 1)
(θ − 1)(Nt − 1) − 1
which leads to similar qualitative results. This case would correspond to the equilibrium mark up proposed
by Yang and Heijdra (1993). A similar version is also adopted by Jaimovich (2007), whose mark up, however,
depends on the degree of substitutability between (intermediate) goods produced in diﬀerent sectors as well.
8interesting extensions would include the analysis of multiproduct ﬁrms which choose the
production or price levels of their goods to maximize the joint proﬁts.
Our ﬁrst extension of the Cournot model with homogenous goods belongs to the tradi-
tional conjectural variations approach. Assuming that each ﬁrm takes as given the diﬀerential
impact of its output choice on the output choice of the other ﬁrms λ ≡ ∂xt(j)/∂xt(i),t h e
equilibrium mark up can be obtained as:
µCV(Nt)=
Nt
(Nt − 1)(1 − λ)
(17)
which nests the case of Cournot competition in quantities for λ =0 , tends to the (indeter-
minate) case of perfect collusion for λ → 1. More importantly, intermediate situations with
λ ∈ (0,1) describe cases of imperfect collusion between the ﬁrms which achieve mark ups
above the Cournot level but below the perfect collusion level.
The second extension introduces asymmetries between ﬁrms building on the theory of
Stackelberg competition.11 Let us assume that a single leader is always active and Nt followers





which is lower compared to the mark up under pure Cournot competition. The proﬁts of
t h el e a d e ra n dt h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ef o l l o w e ra r erespectively larger and smaller than the proﬁts
under Cournot competition.12
2.1.4 Endogenous Entry
In this model, households choose how much to save in riskless bonds and in the creation of
new ﬁrms through the stock market according to standard Euler and asset pricing equations.
The average number of ﬁrms per sector follows the equation of motion:
Nt+1 =( 1− δ)(Nt + Ne
t ) (19)
where Ne
t is the average number of new ﬁrms and δ ∈ (0,1) is the exogenous rate of exit.13
The real value of a ﬁrm Vt is the present discounted value of its future expected proﬁts, or
in recursive form:






where rt is the real interest rate. Entry requires a ﬁxed cost of production equal to η/At
units of labor, where η>0. In each period entry is determined endogenously to equate the
value of ﬁrms to the entry costs. Since the real cost of a unit of labor can be derived from










11The assumption that also the leader cannot commit to a sequence of strategies is crucial here. If the
l e a d e rc o u l dc o m m i t ,i tw o u l de n g a g ei na g g r e s s i v es t r a t e g i e sa i m e da tr e d u c i n go rd e t e r r i n ge n t r yi nt h el o n g
run. See Etro (2008b) for a recent analysis of Stackelberg competition with commitment and endogenous
entry.
12We are grateful to Amhad Naimzada for the derivation of the static Stackelberg equilibrium.
13It would be interesting to endogenize the exit rate as a countercyclical factor: this would strengthen our
propagation mechanism, since it would enhance the countercyclicality of mark ups.
9w h e r ew eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tPt = ptN
1/(1−θ)
t in the symmetric equilibrium, the endogenous







The representative agent supplies labor which is employed to produce goods and to create
new ﬁrms, and pays lump sum taxes. Assuming budget balance without loss of generality
(since Ricardian equivalence holds), in each period taxes are equal to public consumption
Gt, which is spent exactly as private consumption.
Market clearing in the markets for goods, labor and credit determines the dynamics of the
economy, which can be expressed in terms of a system of two equations for the evolution of Nt
and Ct (eventually depending on the evolution of total factor productivity At and government
spending Gt). We leave the details of the derivation to the Appendix and report here the
equilibrium relations for the number of ﬁrms and for consumption of the representative agent,
derived by substituting all the equilibrium conditions into (19) and (20).
In particular, under competition in quantities we have:





















































while under competition in prices we have:


















































β(1 − δ)[1+θ(Nt − 1)]
(26)
The cases of conjectural variations and Stackelberg competition can be derived similarly, but
in the rest of this section we will focus on the baseline cases characterized above. Moreover,
in the following theoretical analysis we will assume inelastic labor demand (ϕ =0 )a n df o c u s
on the deterministic model with Gt =0for any t.
2.2 Dynamics under competition in quantities
Under competition in quantities the deterministic equilibrium system becomes:
















η(θ − 1)(Nt − 1)
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10Given a constant value of the TFP, these two relations provide a simple characterization
of the steady state through two simple relations between consumption and the number of
ﬁrms. These relations can be easily represented in a phase diagram (N,C).I n v e r t i n g t h e









At least for low levels of substitutability (low θ), this expression for C∗ is an inverse-U relation
in N∗ (see Figure 3): with few ﬁrms in steady state, the consumption index increases with
the number of ﬁrms because of the “love for variety” component, but with a large number
of ﬁrms in steady state the consumption index is aﬀected negatively by an increase in the
number of ﬁrms due to the high savings necessary to create new ﬁrms. The steady state





where we referred to this as the golden rule number of ﬁrms/goods, which is increasing in
the productivity level A and decreasing in the degree of substitutability between goods θ,i n
t h er a t eo fe x i to ft h eﬁrms δ and in the parameter of the ﬁxed cost η. Any steady state
with a number of goods larger than NGR would be dynamically ineﬃcient, in the sense that
higher levels of consumption could be permanently reached by reducing entry of ﬁrms.
The second equilibrium equation in steady state becomes:
C∗ =
η[1 − β(1 − δ)](θ − 1)N
∗ θ
θ−1
β(1 − δ)[1+θ/(N∗ − 1)]
(29)
which represents a positive and convex relation between the number of ﬁrms and consumption
(see Figure 3).
This positive relation is due to the role of the ﬁrms in producing consumption goods.
The steady state must satisfy both conditions, and it can be veriﬁed that it always implies
dynamic ineﬃciency, in the sense that the endogenous number of ﬁr m s / g o o d si sa l w a y sa b o v e
the golden rule level.14
Figure 3 shows the phase diagram of the model with the two steady state relations (in
solid lines) and the saddle-path (in dashed line). The equilibrium is saddle-path stable, and,
starting from a situation with a low number of ﬁrms, it implies monotonic convergence to
the steady state through an increase of both consumption and the number of ﬁrms.
Finally, notice that in case of high substitutability between goods (high θ)w eh a v ea
simpler situation. The “love for variety” factor is weak and, according to the ﬁrst steady
state relation, consumption is always decreasing in the number of ﬁrms: in such a case, a
single ﬁrm would maximize steady state consumption. Nevertheless, the ineﬃcient entry
process generates an equilibrium with an excessive number of ﬁrms.
14A similar result in a dynamic general equilibrium framework emerges in the model of Etro (2004), where
endogenous entry implies too many ﬁrms (see also Etro, 2008a).
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Figure 3: Phase Diagram
2.3 Dynamics under competition in prices
Under competition in prices we have:












β(1 − δ)[1+θ(Nt − 1)]Ct












This system can be analyzed in a similar way to the one studied earlier under competi-
tion in quantities, also because, under our assumption of exogenous labor supply, the ﬁrst
equilibrium relation is the same as before. The second one, however, is complicated by the
diﬀerent mark up and proﬁt functions emerging under competition in prices.













These two expressions can be easily represented in a phase diagram (N,C).T h eﬁrst one is the
same hump shaped relation that we obtained in the model with competition in quantities,15
and the considerations made earlier apply here as well. The second expression is a positive
15Further diﬀerences emerge in case of endogenous labor supply, but in this section we have assumed
exogenous labor supply.
12and convex relation due to the role of the ﬁrms in producing consumption goods. Given the
same structural parameters, the steady state implies a smaller number of ﬁrms compared to
the case of competition in quantities.
Finally, the equilibrium is again saddle-path stable, and, starting from a situation with
al o wn u m b e ro fﬁrms, it implies monotonic convergence through an increase of both con-
sumption and the number of ﬁrms.
3 Business Cycle Analysis
This section has multiple purposes. First of all, we wish to evaluate the relative success of
the models considered above at replicating the empirical facts described in the introduction,
namely countercyclical markups together with procyclical proﬁts and procyclical ﬁrms’ entry.
Secondly, we want to identify the extent to which the market structure inﬂuences the propa-
gation of technology and government spending shocks throughout the economy. Finally, we
try to compare the performance of our model with endogenous market structures and that
of a standard RBC model.
Calibration of structural parameters is standard and follows King and Rebelo (2000). The
time unit is meant to be a quarter. The discount factor, β, is set to 0.99, while the rate of
business destruction, δ, equals 0.025 implying an annual rate of 10 %. The value of υ is such
that steady state labor supply is constant and equal to one. The Frish elasticity of labor
supply reduces to ϕ, to which we assign a value of four as in King and Rebelo (2000). We
set steady state productivity to A =1 . The baseline value for the entry cost is set to η =1 .
Notice that the combination of A and η aﬀects the endogenous level of market power because
a low entry cost compared to the size of the market leads to a larger number of competitors
and thus to lower markups, and viceversa. However, the impulse response functions below
are not qualitatively aﬀected by values of η within a reasonable range.16 Finally, we set the
share of government spending over aggregate output to 20 % as in many other studies of the
business cycle.
In what follows we will ﬁrst study the impulse response functions to supply shocks and
demand shocks, and ﬁnally we will evaluate the second order moments. Our model allows
for a large variety of combinations of substitutability between goods (θ)a n dm a r ku p( µ),
which in turn depends on the mode of competition, but we will limit the discussion to a
few explanatory cases leaving further analysis of related situations in the companion paper
(Colciago and Etro, 2007).
3.1 Supply shocks
In this section we show the qualitative reactions of the economy to a standard shock to the
technology parameter following the ﬁrst order autoregressive process ˆ At+1 = ρA ˆ At + εAt,
where ρA ∈ (0,1) is the autocorrelation coeﬃcient and εAt is a white noise disturbance, with
zero expected value and standard deviation σA. Figures 4-6 depict percentage deviations
from the steady state of key variables in response to a one percent technology shock with
persistency ρA =0 .9 in case of alternative market structures; time on the horizontal axis is
in quarters.
16We provide a sensitivity analisys of our result with respect to η for given A in Colciago and Etro (2007).
When the steady state number of ﬁrms increases, the sensitivity of the mark ups to entry diminuishes but it
applies to a larger number of goods. Therefore the fundamental moments exibit minor changes.
13In Figures 4 and 5 we report the impulse response functions for diﬀerent values of θ
under respectively competition in quantities and in prices. To evaluate the results, let us
consider the standard case of low substitutability between goods with θ =6 , which is in
line with the typical calibration for monopolistic competition.17 Under competition in prices
and in quantities the market structure is generated endogenously and the steady state mark
ups are respectively 22 % and 35 %, both belonging to the empirically reasonable range.
As well known, when ﬁrms compete in prices the equilibrium mark ups are lower, which in
t u r na l l o w sf o ral o w e rn u m b e ro fﬁrms to be active in the market: this implies that the
model is characterized by a lower number of goods compared to the model with competition
in quantities. Since this requires a smaller number of new ﬁrms to be created in steady
state, lower mark ups are associated with a lower savings rate as well. In spite of these
substantial diﬀerences in the steady state features of the economy, Figures 4 and 5 show
that the quantitative reactions of the main aggregate variables to the shock are surprisingly
similar in these two models with low substitutability.
Under both frameworks, the temporary shock increases individual output and proﬁts on
impact, which creates large proﬁt opportunities. This attracts entry of new ﬁrms, which in
turn strengthens competition and reduces the equilibrium mark ups. Therefore, our model
manages to generate individual and aggregate proﬁts that are procyclical despite mark ups
being countercyclical, in line with the empirical evidence on business cycles. Notice that the
dampening eﬀect of competition on the mark ups is stronger under competition in quantities,
where entry erodes proﬁts margins faster than under competition in prices:18 this justiﬁes
higher entry and lower mark ups under competition in prices. The number of ﬁrms and the
stock market value of the representative ﬁrm remain above their steady state levels along
all the transition path. While the shock vanishes and entry strengthens competition, output
and proﬁts of the ﬁrms drop and the incentives to enter disappear. At some point net exit
from the market occurs and the mark ups start increasing toward the initial level.
The impact of these reactions on the real variables resembles that of a basic RBC model,
even if it derives from largely diﬀerent mechanisms. Aggregate output jumps up and gradually
reverts to the steady state level, being initially fueled by the reduction in the mark ups
associated with entry and by the increase in labor supply associated with higher wages. Part
of the increase in income (from higher wages and proﬁts) is saved because the interest rate
is increased by the sudden improvement of the proﬁt opportunities. Savings are invested in
ﬁrm creation, which in turn pushes output up and the interest rate down: the feedback eﬀect
on consumption generates its hump shaped path. However, contrary to standard models,
here the impact of the shock on consumption is strengthened by a new competition eﬀect.
Entry of new ﬁrms stregthens competition and temporarily reduces the mark ups, which in
turn boosts consumption.
To sum up, the productivity shock reduces not only the marginal cost (as already happens
in the RBC model), but also the equilibrium mark up (which is zero in the RBC model and
constant in the models with monopolistic competition), therefore the intertemporal substi-
tution toward current consumption is stronger when the market structure is endogenous. In
other words, the impact of a temporary shock on consumption is magniﬁed in the presence
of endogenous market structures.19
17The qualitative behavior of the impulse response functions is similar in case of θ =3 ,w h i c hd e l i v e r s
larger steady state mark ups (63% under competition in quantities and 40 % under competition in prices).
18Recall that the mark up elasticity to the number of ﬁrms is larger under competition in quantities, as
pointed out in the previous section.
19As well known, this eﬀect is limited by the logarithmic preferences in consumption, which imply a unitary
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. With an isoelastic utility function, the competition eﬀect would be
14This analysis makes clear that endogenous market structures with low substitutability
between products can provide reasonable qualitative responses to technology shocks and can
also reproduce the dynamic behavior of proﬁts and mark ups which is substantially ignored
within the standard RBC framework. As noticed earlier, our general model should be inter-
preted as a model of a representative sector with a potentially high degree of substitutability
between goods. When we increase the degree of substitutability (θ) the same qualitative re-
sults hold, at least under competition in quantities. In particular, consider the extreme case
of homogenous goods (θ →∞ ), that corresponds to the typical assumption of the RBC lit-
erature: in such a case, our model with competition in quantities is compatible with positive
(Cournot) mark ups and, as we can see in Figure 4, it is able to reproduce a similar propaga-
t i o nm e c h a n i s mt ot h eo n ew eh a v ej u s ts e e n .On the contrary, under competition in prices
and homogenous (or highly substitutable) goods, the model collapses to one where mark
ups vanish and entry does not take place because of the positive ﬁxed costs of production
(therefore we did not display this case in Figure 5). For this reason, and contrary to a long
standing literature, we consider the model with competition in quantities as a better tool for
macroeconomic analysis of the business cycles in the presence of realistic (and endogenous)
market structures.
The above comparison between two models featuring the same structural parameters but
diﬀerent modes of competition can be interesting in its own, but its interpretation is limited
b yt h ef a c tt h a ti nd i ﬀerent markets diﬀerent forms of competition take place - and most of
the times we are not even able to screen between them. An alternative comparison which
can be useful to understand the implications of endogenous market structures emerges when
models with equal steady state mark ups are studied. In such a case all the aggregate ratios
are the same as well, and diﬀerent responses to a shock reveal fundamental diﬀerences of
alternative modes of competition. To study a comparison of this second type, let us consider
the model with competition in prices and θ =6(Figure 5). This model is characterized by
a steady state mark up of 22 %. Under our parametrization, the same mark up emerges
endogenously in a model of competition in quantities when the goods are homogenous, that
is with θ →∞(Figure 4).
Eyeball comparison between the impulse response functions of these two cases with a mark
up of 22% (and therefore with equal steady state values) shows that the eﬀect of competition
on the markup is stronger in the case where ﬁrms compete in quantities and goods are
homogenous. This aﬀects the impact response of consumption, which is clearly stronger
under homogenous goods and competition in quantities rather than under low substitutability
and competition in prices.20 Strategic interaction between ﬁrms selling homogeneous goods
brings about a substantially stronger competition eﬀect on consumption and it contributes
to solve the low variability of consumption puzzle identiﬁed in standard RBC models.
Finally, with the purpose of illustrating the potentiality of our approach to study the
relation between market structures and the business cycle, in Figure 6 we present the impulse
response functions for diﬀerent models of competition in quantities with homogenous goods:
the symmetric Cournot case (already present in Figure 4), a model with conjectural variations
with λ =0 .15, that leads to imperfect collusion, and a model of Stackelberg competition.
The endogenous mark ups are respectively 22 % for Cournot case, 35% for the conjectural
variations and 15 % for the Stackelberg case - in which output, proﬁts and stock market
value of the leader are larger than those of the followers. The impulse response functions
stronger when the elasticity of substitution is larger than unity.
20The same holds compared to low substitutability and competition in quantities, as we can see from










































































































































































































































Figure 6: Impulse response to a persistent technology shock. Homogenous goods.
18follow similar paths from a qualitative point of view, but there are substantial quantitative
diﬀerences. For instance, compared to the Cournot case, consumption smoothing is more
relevant when the markets are characterized by imperfect collusion and higher mark ups, and
less relevant when they are characterized by a market leader whose overproduction reduces
the mark ups.21
A deeper evaluation of these models requires second moments analysis, which will be
presented later. Before that, we need to evaluate qualitatively the response of the models to
ad i ﬀerent kind of shock: an aggregate demand shock.
3.2 Demand Shocks
We now consider the impact of a demand shock associated, as standard in the theory of
business cycles, with a change in government spending. We assume that government spending
follows the ﬁrst order autoregressive process ˆ Gt+1 = ρG ˆ Gt + εGt,w h e r eρG ∈ (0,1) is the
autocorrelation coeﬃcient and εGt is a white noise disturbance, with zero expected value and
standard deviation σG.
Figure 7 depicts the response of key variables to a one percent government spending shock
with persistency ρG =0 .9. We report the case of competition in quantities under alternative
parameterizations for the elasticity of substitution between goods. Solid lines depict the case
where θ =3which delivers a steady state markup equal to 63 %, dashed lines represent the
case case with θ =6and a markup of 35 %, and ﬁnally dotted lines are relative to the case
with homogeneous goods (θ →∞ ) and a 22% markup.
As in the standard neoclassical model (Barro, 1981), the temporary shock to govern-
ment spending creates a boom because the initial reduction in private consumption is more
than compensated by the increase in public spending. As a consequence, labor demand for
production increases. Consumers feel poorer and increase their labor supply. In the RBC
framework the net eﬀect would be given by a reduction of the wage rate and by a reduction
of consumption, with both remaining below the steady state level along the entire transition
path; meanwhile, the interest rate would jump up and gradually decrease toward its initial
level. In our model, however, there are new mechanisms that substantially change the impact
of the demand shock.
First of all, the shock increases individual output and proﬁts on impact. This attracts
entry of new ﬁrms, which has two consequences. The ﬁrst one is that the demand of labor for
the creation of new ﬁrms goes up, which leads to a stronger increase in total labor demand and
ultimately to an increase in the wage rate (the opposite compared to the RBC framework),
which promotes consumption. The second (and possibly more important) consequence is that
entry strengthens competition and endogenously reduces the equilibrium mark ups. Again,
this competition eﬀect makes current consumption more attractive for the consumers.22
The impact of these two mechanisms is to counterbalance the initial drop in consumption.
When substitutability between goods is low, consumption goes above the steady state level
after a few quarters and gradually returns toward its long run level from above, which is in
sharp contrast with the dynamic response of consumption delivered by the standard RBC
model (where converge of consumption to steady state is monotonic from below the steady
21See Colciago and Etro (2007) for further analysis of the temporary and permanent shocks under alterna-
tive market structures with homogenous goods.
22Therefore the model is consistent with the suggested requirement of Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) of
a real wage increasing after a positive demand shock. Nevertheless the reaction of the real wage is limited,














































































Figure 7: Impulse response to a persistent government spending shock.
20Va ri a b le σ(X) σ (X)/σ (Y ) E (Xt,X t−1) Corr(X,Y)
Y 1.66, 1.39 1 0.84, 0.72 1
C 1.19, 0.60 0.75, 0.43 0.78, 0.78 0.76, 0.94
I 4.97, 4.09 2,99 2.59 0.87, 0.70 0.79, 0.98
L 1.82, 0.67 1.10, 0.48 0.90, 0.70 0.88, 0.97
Π 8.08,n . a . 4.87,n . a . 0.76,n . a . 0.67,n . a .
µ 0.99,n . a . 0.60,n . a . 0.79,n . a . −0.28,n . a .
T a b l e1 :S e c o n dm o m e n t s .L e f t :U Sd a t a .R i g h t :R B Cm o d e l
state level) and not too far from the available evidence.23 Overall, these dynamic paths
are radically diﬀerent from the standard RBC models and they are potentially more in line
with the mixed empirical evidence on the impact of demand shocks - in particular with the
procyclicality of proﬁts and countercyclicality of markups.
3.3 Second Moments
To further assess the implications of endogenous market structures for the business cycle,
we compute second moments of the key macroeconomic variables. In this exercise we follow
the RBC literature and assume that the only source of random ﬂuctuations are technology
shocks. We calibrate the productivity process as in King and Rebelo (2000), with persistence
ρA =0 .979 and standard deviation σA =0 .0072. For future reference we report in Table 1 the
performance of the standard RBC model24 with respect to the statistics on US data (1947:1 /
2007:3) for output Y , consumption C,i n v e s t m e n tI, labor force L, aggregate proﬁts Π and the
mark up µ.25 We computed two alternative measures of the price markup. Since our model
features a sunk cost in term of units of labor, both of them allow for overhead labor costs.
The measure reported in Table 1 is the labor-share based measure considered by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999). A second one is a model based measure and leads to similar qualitative
results but is substantially more volatile and displays stronger countercyclicality.26
As well known, the main problems of the RBC model are the limited variability of output
and especially consumption and labor force, and the lack of explanations for the cyclical
movement of proﬁts and mark ups. As we will see, our model allows to improve the perfor-
mance of the standard RBC model in all these dimensions.
Table 2 reports second moments of Y , C, I ≡ NeV , L, Π, and mark up µ for our
23See Galì et al. (2007,b) for a recent reference.
24The benchmark RBC model we consider is that by King and Rebelo (2000). Our utility function diﬀers
from theirs in the subutility from labour supply, but the second moments are equivalent under the same
calibration.
25Variables have been logged. We report theoretical moments of HP ﬁltered variables with a smoothing
parameter equal to 1600. Proﬁts include both the remunaration of capital and the extra-proﬁts due to market
power: while we could not distinguish between the two, future research may try to do it.
26The model based measure of the price mark up takes into account that in our model the mark ups can be
expressed as µt = Ct/wt (Lt − Le
t), i.e. as the inverse of the share of labor in consumption beyond the sunk





and Corr(µ,Y )=−0.63. The measure of the labor share used in our computation is given by the ratio
of the compensation of employees in the nonfarm business sector to GDP. None of the cyclical properties
we report are substantially altered using (GDP-PROPRIETORS’ INCOME) instead of GDP. For both the
markup measures we consider, the ratio of the overhead quantity of labor to the steady state aggregate labor
input is assumed to be 0.2. This is within the range of values endogenously delivered at the steady state by
our model under both competitive frameworks.
21Va ri a b le σ(X) σ (X)/σ (Y ) E (Xt,X t−1) Corr(X,Y)
Y 1.52, 1.51 1 0.68, 0.68 1
C 0.78, 0.78 0.51, 0.52 0.77, 0.76 0.94, 0.95
I 5.89, 7.56 3.87, 5.00 0.65, 0.64 0.97, 0.97
L 0.85, 0.77 0.56, 0.50 0.65, 0.64 0.96, 0.96
Π 0.70, 0.74 0.46, 0.49 0.71, 0.72 0.99, 0.98
µ 0.15, 0.13 0.10, 0.08 0.95, 0.94 −0.17, −0.17
Table 2: Second moments under low substitability. Left: Competition in quantities; Right:
Competition in prices
model with competition in quantities and with competition in prices under the common
parameterization with low substitutability between goods (θ =6 ), corresponding to the
impulse response functions of Figures 4 and 5.27 Both the competitive frameworks provide a
similar performance at reproducing some key features of the U.S. business cycle. Imperfect
competition, strategic interaction and endogenous entry allow to outperform the standard
RBC framework in a number of aspects.
Endogenous mark up ﬂuctuations together with endogenous entry deliver a substantially
higher output volatility with respect to the RBC model (1.51/1.52 against 1.39), almost
matching the one emerging from US data. As emphasized above, we can capture procyclical
proﬁts and entry together with countercyclical mark ups as in the data. This is obtained
through the direct eﬀect that entry has on the degree of competition rather that by resorting
to an ad hoc functional form speciﬁcation for preferences as in Bilbiie et al. (2007a,b) or
Bergin and Corsetti (2005). Our model provides a good match for the correlation of proﬁts
and mark ups with output, but it underestimates their variability, emphasizing the need for
further work on the microfoundation of the endogenous market structures to better explain
the high volatility of both proﬁts and mark ups. Moreover, mark up countercyclicality allows
to strengthen the propagation of the shock on aggregate demand through the competition
eﬀect. Both models display an absolute and relative (with respect to output) variability of
consumption larger than that delivered by the RBC model. Since low variability of con-
sumption is a well known shortcoming of the RBC theory, the competition eﬀect delivered by
strategic interaction and endogenous entry appears to be a relevant channel to overcome it.
Finally, notice that, compared to the RBC framework, our model with endogenous market
structures slightly improves the performance in terms of variability of the labor force.28
Even if we do not report a sensitivity analysis here, the variability of output increases
further (but that of consumption goes down) when lower degrees of substitutability between
goods are taken in consideration, while it decreases (and the variability of consumption goes
up) for higher degrees of substitutability, under both forms of competition.
Table 3 reports second moments for the model with competition in quantities in the case
of homogeneous goods, corresponding to the case presented in Figure 4. The relevance of
this extreme model relies on the fact that it assumes perfect substitutability between goods
exactly as in the standard RBC framework, therefore the diﬀerence in performance derives
from the endogeneity of the market structures.
The ﬁgures suggest that high elasticity of substitution coupled with market concentra-
27As in Bilbiie et al. (2007b) we report moments of data consistent variables, i.e. deﬂated using the average
price index rather than the consumption based price index.
28As in the RBC framework, introducing indivisible-labor a la Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) may
improve further the performance of the model.
22Va ri a b l e σ(X) σ(X)/σ (Y ) E (Xt,X t−1) Corr(X,Y )
Y 1.36 1 0.67 1
C 0.87 0.64 0.78 0.94
I 5.86 4.31 0.63 0.92
L 0.57 0.42 0.60 0.93
Π 0.70 0.51 0.63 0.99
µ 0.10 0.07 0.93 −0.29
Table 3: Second moments. Competition in quantities with homogeneous goods
tion enhances consumption volatility with respect to the case where goods are imperfectly
sustitutable. Also the contemporaneous correlation of the markup with output matches
closely that assumed by the labor share-based measure of the markup reported above. This
is however obtained at the cost of volatility of aggregate output and labor supply which are
lower that in the cases considered above - but still in line with the results from the standard
RBC model. In conclusion, the model with homogenous goods and competition in quantities
(Cournot competition) is able to perform quite well in matching the cyclical properties of
proﬁts and mark ups, on which the neoclassical model is completely silent, and it provides a
better approximation of the variability of consumption in front of real shocks.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this article we have studied a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with ﬂexible
prices where the structure of the markets is endogenous and accounts for strategic interactions
of diﬀerent kinds. The model belongs to the emerging literature on endogenous market
structures in the macroeconomy and it provides some improvements in the explanation of
the business cycle compared to the standard RBC framework. Our characterization of the
market structure allows to explain the procyclical variability of the proﬁts together with the
countercyclical variability of the mark ups. Nevertheless, we have emphasized a mark up
and proﬁt volatility puzzle: further examinations of alternative market structures should be
aimed at matching the high levels of volatility that emerge from the empirical investigation
of US mark ups and proﬁts.
Many other extensions could be studied. The model could be expanded to an international
context (see Ghironi and Melitz, 2005, for a related attempt, in which strategic interactions
were not taken in consideration) to study international business cycle issues and optimal
policy coordination in an open economy context.29 The model could be also extended to
sticky prices as in Bilbiie et al. (2007a), to sticky quantities introducing rigidities in the
strategy choice within the model with competition in quantities, and to sticky entry assuming
that entry takes time: all these extensions could be fruitful to investigate the relation between
endogenous market structures and monetary shocks.
We want to end this work with a limited but hopefully fertile conclusion: endogenous
market structures do matter for macroeconomic issues. While most of the recent approach
to the study of business cycles has been based either on perfect competition, constant returns
to scale and zero mark ups or on monopolistic competition, increasing returns to scale and
positive and constant mark ups, we have shown that strategic interactions leading to a link
29See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996) for a standard reference on the topic, and more recently, Colciago et al.
(2007).
23between entry, mark ups and prices can substantially aﬀect the way an economy reacts to
shocks.
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Appendix A: analytical details
The representative agent maximizes intertemporal utility (1) choosing how much to invest in
bonds and risky stocks out of labor and capital income. Without loss of generality, bonds and stocks









= WtLt +( 1+rt)P1tBt +
M X
k=1
P1t [πkt(θ,Nt)+Vkt]Nktskt − P1tTt (32)
where Bt is net bond holdings with interest rate rt, Vkt is the value of a ﬁrm from sector k, Nkt
and Ne
kt are the active ﬁrms in sector k and the new ﬁrms founded in this sector at the end of the
period, skt is the share of the stock market value of the ﬁrms of sector k that are owned by the
agent, and Tt are lump sum taxes, which equate public spending under budget balance.
After solving the budget constraint for consumption of good 1 and substituting in the utility
function, the optimality conditions with respect to Ckt and skt+1 f o re a c hs e c t o r ,a n dw i t hr e s p e c t
to Bt+1 and Lt are:





























25For each sector k, demand for the single goods is allocated according to (6) in the text. Each
good i =1 ,2,...,Nkt in sector k =1 ,2,...,M is produced by a single ﬁrm using labor according
to (5). Uniperiodal nominal proﬁts are given by Πt [xt(i)] or Πt [pt(i)] in the text according to
whether competition in quantities or in prices takes place, and each ﬁrm chooses its strategy xt(i)
or pt(i) to maximize the sum of the current proﬁts and the value of the ﬁrm Vkt(i) taking as
given the strategies of the other ﬁrms. Notice that, in the absence of credible commitments to a
sequence of future strategies, the optimal strategy is the one that maximizes current proﬁts because
this does not aﬀect the future value of the ﬁrm. Endogenous market structures for each sector as
described in the text generate a number of ﬁrms Nkt,m a r ku p sµ(θ,Nkt), and nominal proﬁts
Πkt =[ 1− 1/µ(θ,Nkt)]PktCkt for each ﬁrm.
Following Bilbiie et al. (2007a,b), we adopt a probability δ ∈ [0,1] with which any ﬁrm can
exit from the market for exogenous reasons in each period. The dynamic equation determining the
number of ﬁr m si ne a c hs e c t o ri st h e n :
Nkt+1 =( 1− δ)(Nkt + Ne
kt) ∀k (37)
which provides the dynamic path for the average number of ﬁrms:








=( 1 − δ)(Nt + Ne
t ) (38)
where, of course, we have Nt ≡ (1/M)
PM





Market clearing in the asset markets requires Bt =0for any t in the bond market, and skt =1
for any sector k in the stock market. In a symmetric equilibrium, the number of ﬁrms, the mark up
and the proﬁts are the same in every sector, which leads to the following equilibrium relations:



















































Given the real marginal cost of production wt/At, the equilibrium price in units of consumption
is pt/Pt = µ(θ,Nt)wt/At. Since in the symmetric equilibrium Pt = ptN
−1/(θ−1)
t ,w eh a v e
pt/Pt = N
1/(θ−1)







26As customary, assume that public spending is allocated in the same way as private spending,
so that total expenditure per sector is Et = Pt (Ct + Gt).S i n c e Et = Ntytpt,w em u s th a v e





(µ(θ,Nt) − 1)(Ct + Gt)
µ(θ,Nt)Nt
To endogenize the number of ﬁrms, we assume that entry requires a ﬁxed cost of entry which
is proportional to the costs of production.
30 In particular, entry requires an amount of labor force
η/At with η>0, for a total cost Ft = ηwt/At. The endogeneity of the market structure requires










Labor demand must be the sum of labor in the production of goods, which is equal to Lc
t =
M (Ct + Gt)/AN
1/(θ−1)





t )a n di nt h ec r e a t i o n
of new ﬁrms, which must be equal to Le
t = MNe
t η/A. By Walras’ law, market clearing in the labor
market is guaranteed.
Since the resource constraint of the economy can be rewritten in real terms as:
M (Ct + Gt + Ne
t Vt)=MNtπt(θ,Nt)+wtLt (47)



















The above equations fully characterize the equilibrium, and they can be reduced to a system of two
equations representing the dynamics of Nt and Ct,n a m e l y :








































which crucially depend on the mark up functions, and therefore on the form of competition.
Finally we present the log-linearizations of the model. Assume inelastic labor supply for simplicity
(ϕ =0 ). Log-linearizing the general equilibrium system around its steady state we obtain the system
for the local dynamics. Under competition in quantities we have:
ˆ Nt+1 =
µ
1 − δ +
(r + δ)(N∗ − 1)




(r + δ)(θ − 1)(N∗ − 1)




(r + δ)(θ − 1)(N∗ − 1)
(N∗ + θ − 1)
¸
ˆ At
30Similar ﬁxed costs of entry are used in Bilbiie et al. (2007b) and also in Etro (2004, 2008a) to endogenize































N∗ +2 ( θ − 1)
N∗ + θ − 1
¸
ˆ Nt+1
This system can be explicitly solved for the two future variables in function of their current values.
Under competition in prices we have:
ˆ Nt+1 =
µ
1 − δ +






































[1 + θ(N∗ − 1)](N∗ − 1)
−
(r + δ)θN∗
(1 − δ)[1+θ(N∗ − 1)]
¸
ˆ Nt+1
which can be also solved for the two future variables in function of their current values. Stability of
the system can be shown as in Bilbiie et al. (2007b) with standard methods.
Appendix B: data sources
The data derive from FRED, the Federeal Reserve Economic Database of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. Below, we report in brackets the mnemonics of each series.
Compensation of Employees (COE): Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual
Rate (saar), 1947-01-01 2007-07-01.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, saar, 1947-01-01 2007-07-01.
Proprietors’ Income with inventory valuation adjustment (IVA) and capital consumption adjust-
ment (PROPINC): Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, saar, 1947-01-01 2007:07-01.
Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCEC): Billions of Dollars, saar, 1947-01-01 2007-07-01.
Corporate Proﬁts with inventory Valuation Adjustment (IVA) and Capital Consumption Ad-
justment (CPROFIT): Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, saar, 1947-01-01 2007-04-01.
Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deﬂator (PCEC): Index 2000=100, Quarterly, Seasonally
Adjusted (sa), 1947-01-01 2007-07-01.
Hours of all Persons, nonfarm business sector (HOANBS): Index 1992=100, Quarterly, sa, 1947-
01-01 2007-07-01.
Fixed Private Investment (FPI): Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, saar, 1947-01-01 2007-07-01.




Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) assume the existence of overhead labor so that eﬀective labor for
the production of consumption goods is Lc










b µt = −
lo
1 − lo
ˆ Lt − b st
where lo ≡ Lo
t/Lt represents the average share of overhead labor over total labor input (assumed
to be equal to 0.2), st ≡ wtLt/At (Lt − Lo
t) is the labor share of income, and hatted variables
indicate percentage deviations from the HP trend. Second moments derived from this measure
of the mark ups are reported in Table 1. We also calculated a second measure of the mark up
based on the existence of labor employed to create new ﬁrms in our model and on the fact that
Ct = At (Lt − Le
t).S e t t i n gse
t ≡ wtLt/At (Lt − Le
t) and le ≡ Le
t/Lt,w eh a v e :
b µt = −
le
1 − le
ˆ Lt − b se
t
Since le is between 15% and 25% in our calibrated economy, we used again a baseline value of 0.2.
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